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Abstract
This paper argues against both lean and
rich interpretations of early social cognition
in infants and apes using as an illustration the
results of a longitudinal study comparing the
emergence of joint attention and tool use pat-
terns in an infant gorilla. In contrast with tool
use (where well-formed manipulations result-
ed in near perfect rates of reward obtention)
the emergence of well-formed acts of commu-
nication with eye contact not only had no ef-
fect upon the rewards obtained, but increased
the proportion of “explicit denials” of requests.
It is argued that this suggests eye contact is
learned and used as an intersubjective signal
of communicative intentionality and not
through simple associative mechanisms of re-
ward contingency detection. However, it is
also argued that rich interpretations of early
social cognition are not needed to explain the
development of communicative and intersub-
jective intentions.
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Introduction
Ever since the beginnings of research on ear-
ly social interaction and communication in in-
fants, there has been a theoretical tension be-
tween those willing to explain the complexity
uncovered in adult-infant interaction as the re-
sult of rich underlying cognitive abilities (e.g.,
Bretherton et al., 1981), and those willing to
propose leaner accounts of infant social cogni-
tion (e.g., Shatz, 1983). A similar tension exists
among comparative researchers when trying to
explain the complexity of non-human primates
social interaction and the degree of similarity
between human and non-human social cogni-
tion: some defend lean accounts, others rich ac-
counts of primate social cognition. Paradoxical-
ly it is not infrequent that a lean approach
towards non-human animals is accompanied by
a rich approach towards human infants
(Tomasello et al., 2007). In this paper I build
upon earlier proposals (Gómez, Sarriá, and
Tamarit, 1993; Gómez, 2007) to explore a “bal-
anced”, intermediate approach to the social cog-
nitive skills of infants and non-human primates.
Lean approaches typically try to explain
what infants or primates do (e.g., gaze following
or pointing behaviours) as simple instances of
trial and error learning and associations be-
tween behaviours and outcomes with no or little
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insight into the causal links that connect those
behaviours with their outcomes (other people’s
reactions). For example, the gaze following re-
action (looking at the same target as others) has
been found to be a universal of primate social
cognition (Gómez, 2005). However, authors like
Povinelli and Eddy (1996) suggest that in non-
human primates it is either a reflex reaction or a
blindly learnt habit devoid of any understanding
of the other’s gaze as implying any sort of visual
experience of an object. A similar lean approach
was defended by Moore (2008) for gaze follow-
ing in human infants. According to him, infants
might simply be learning that turning in the
same direction as others usually leads to finding
something of interest. No need of invoking early
theories of mind or complex social cognition
for explaining this. However, an experiment by
Moore himself suggests that there is more to
gaze following than simple associative learning.
Corkum and Moore (1998), working with 8-9
month-old infants who had not yet learned to
follow gaze on their own, tried to teach them
gaze following responses with selective rein-
forcement in an experimental setting. A group of
children consistently found a reinforcing event
if they looked in the same direction as an exper-
imenter; however, a second group found the re-
inforcing event only if they looked in the direc-
tion opposite to where the experimenter looked.
If gaze following is learned through simple as-
sociation, this group of children should have
learned to look in the direction opposite to the
adult. However, they were completely unable to
learn this reverse, unnatural contingency,
whereas children in the normal gaze following
group learned easily to follow the gaze of the
adult. Even more surprisingly, children in the
reverse contingency group spontaneously
learned to follow gaze in the natural direction,
despite never being rewarded for doing so. Gaze
direction is not just an arbitrary stimulus: there
seems to be something intrinsically directional
in gaze that tightly constraints what can be
learned and how it is learned. The rules of sim-
ple associative learning did not apply here.
Rich interpretations posit that behaviours
like gaze following and pointing (a more active,
intentional way of making others look to or act
upon an object), appearing or well established by
the end of the second year of life in human in-
fants, reflect complex cognitive skills, including
an understanding of what others can see and
what they can know and ignore. For example,
Tomasello et al. (2007) propose that infants use
pointing in a way essentially similar to how
adults do. They attribute to infants an ability to
understand the informative and communicative
intentions behind their own pointing and the
pointing of others. In support of this interpreta-
tion they present findings like the following.
When 12 month-old infants point out an inter-
esting event to someone else, they are not happy
if the person simply attends, gesticulates or
emotes to them: they require that the person at-
tends to and emotes about the object they are
pointing at (Gómez et al., 1983; Tomasello et al.,
2007). Moreover, when requesting an object with
a pointing gesture, 12 month-old infants may
not be satisfied if they get the object by chance.
For example, if the person looks at the wrong
object and gives them the right one, they typi-
cally insist and repeat their request, as if what
they need is to be understood, not just to get a re-
ward. Tomasello et al. (2007) argue that results
like these suggest that infant communication in-
volves a sophisticated understanding of commu-
nicative intentions, including an understanding
of what is jointly known or intended.
These same authors defend, however, that
non-human communication even among the
great apes, our closest relatives, may be much
simpler. For example, when chimpanzees and
other apes point to request food or objects from
others, they might be acting just on the basis of
their desire to make others do things without a
true grasping of what others understand and
know, and especially without entering into true
joint attention and action. At most, apes may un-
derstand that others have individual intentions
about objects, but not communicative intentions.
In a commentary on the above paper
(Gómez, 2007) I have defended the need to find
an alternative “balanced” interpretation of what
is involved in early social cognition, both for
apes and human infants. I propose that behav-
iours like gaze following and pointing can be
interpreted as involving a mentalistic under-
standing of behaviour, but one that occurs at
the level of intentionality, not at the level of un-
derstanding the representational mind. In this
sense, communicative intentions and shared
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knowledge need not require complex represen-
tations of the type “I know that you know what I
want” “or “we jointly and mutually know X”,
but rather representations of aboutness and mu-
tual aboutness, which, in turn, cannot be ex-
plained neither in human infants nor in apes as
simple associative behaviours.
In what follows, I will present empirical evi-
dence against lean interpretations of ape com-
munication (their use of eye contact and mutual
attention to regulate interaction with humans),
but instead of concluding that ape social behav-
iour demands a rich cognitive interpretation, I
will be defending a “balanced” model midway
between the rich and the lean.
Comparing tool use and communica-
tion: a case study
In lean interpretations it has been frequently
suggested that infant communication or ape
communication is a form of social tool use
(Bard, 1990) in which the tool happens to be
another animate being. Although the term “so-
cial tool” is sometimes used metaphorically, oth-
er times it is used with the suggestion that the
same underlying cognitive processes might be
responsible for communication and tool use in
infant development. This hypothesis has been
essentially discarded for human infants, because
no correlation exists between the development
of tool use and the emergence of intentional
communication (Sarriá y Rivière, 1991). How-
ever, the parallelism is still frequently suggested
for ape communication, given its “selfish” and
protoimperative nature.
In the 1980s I conducted a longitudinal
study on the emergence of communication and
early cognitive development in a hand-reared
gorilla (Muni) interacting with human adults in
a zoo nursery setting. One of the findings was
that, among other gestures, the infant gorilla
developed a set of “contact gestures” consisting
of taking people by their hand to places or tak-
ing the hand of people to objects she wanted
them to manipulate (Gómez, 1989, 1990). This
gesture seems to be ideally suited to assess the
notion of communication as “social tool use”.
Since the observational data collected contained
also observations on the development of tool
use, it is possible to make a direct comparison
of the emergence of tool use as object manipu-
lation for problem solving and social commu-
nicative strategies in similar problem solving
contexts. The findings I will be discussing here
correspond to the period when Muni was be-
tween 6 and 30 months of age1. In problem solv-
ing contexts, physical tool use emerged before
the use of communicative strategies. I will start
therefore discussing this.
How Muni learned to use tools
effectively
The key for successful tool use (for exam-
ple, using a stick to obtain an out of reach ob-
ject or placing a pole or a box such that it can be
used as a “ladder” to reach an object) consists of
applying to the tool a force appropriate to its
weight and the movement one is trying to pro-
voke, orienting this force in the appropriate di-
rection and for the necessary time and upon the
correct part of the target and the intermediary
objects. While the object is being moved in the
desired direction, one must typically monitor
the relative positions of means and ends and
make adjustments to the force and direction of
the tool as a function of the position of the ob-
ject and the final goal. Checking looks at the
tool, object and goal are typically part of this
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1 Muni was wild-born in Equatorial Guinea. She had been wounded by poachers and given to the Zoo for
veterinary treatment. After recovery, she was hand-reared by persons in the nursery environment of the Zoo ac-
cording to typical hand-rearing routines (Fritz and Fritz, 1985), which include extensive contact with adult hu-
mans who act as surrogate attachment figures and some human infant-like routines, such as bottle feeding and
occasionally nappy and cloth wearing, as well as access to a variety of toys. Researchers were integrated as part
of the team of people taking care of the gorilla. Muni spent her first year in the zoo in daily contact with human
adults (about 8 hours per day). After that she was integrated into a group with other orphan gorilla infants of
similar ages, but she continued to enjoy a few hours of contact with humans a few days per week (see Gómez,
1992, for more methodological details).
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adjustment process. For example, when trying
to lean a pole on the wall to be able to climb on
it to reach the latch of a door, Muni would look
alternately to the pole, the wall and the latch
position while groping until a stable position
close enough to the latch was found.
Muni perfected her tool using skills slowly
but steadily. As shown in figure 1, her first at-
tempts at using tools were completely unsuc-
cessful and only little by little, week after week,
she gained in mastery and reached a success
level of 90%. This increase in successful tool
manipulation (from 0% to 90% in five months)
reflects how the gorilla learned from experience
how best to handle tools in relation with other
objects and substrates.
How Muni learned to recruit people’s
help in solving problems
Muni’s first attempts at recruiting humans to
help her solve a problem seemingly consisted
in using them as inanimate objects that she
tried to move mechanically in the required di-
rection (13 months of age), as if they were just
one more manipulable object. This later gave
rise to gently suggesting the desired movement
and waiting for the humans to execute it on
their own (20 months of age), which was fol-
lowed by making eye contact while gently lead-
ing the humans and/or their hand to the appro-
priate object or location (29 months of age).
This has been described in detail in Gómez
(1990, 1991, 2004). Muni, therefore, passed
through a number of stages in the development
of her idiosyncratic contact gesture —taking
people by the hand or taking the hand of people
to objects2.
The key element in the development of these
gestures was their coordination with eye con-
tact patterns. Indeed I suggested that it is this
coordination that confers communicative in-
tentionality to the behaviours displayed by the
gorilla (Gómez, 1991). This point was supported
by the fact that some children with autism, who
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2 Contact gestures were not Muni’s only way of interacting with humans. She also offered objects or ex-
tended her arm in a sort of pointing gesture, as ways not only of requesting help with problems or actions lead-
ing to extrinsic rewards, but also to regulate cooperative interactions of the type described by Hubley and Tre-
varthen (1979) as “secondary intersubjectivity” (Gómez, in press).
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Figure 1. Development of the ability to successfully use tools to solve problems between
september 1980 (age 9 months) and March 1981 (age 15 months). Results are presented in
15 days intervals, except those corresponding to 1981 which are presented in 1 month
intervals. They show percentage of tool using attempts that were successful.
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display hand-taking contact gestures similar to
those found in Muni, however fail to coordinate
them with eye contact behaviours (Phillips et
al., 1994).
However, contact gestures are ideal candi-
dates to be considered as by-products of asso-
ciative learning or social tool use based upon
physical attempts at spurring humans into ac-
tion. The use of eye contact in communication
can be construed as a simple case of stimulus
discrimination in an operant learning scenario,
where making eye contact is both an effective
way of spurring others into action and a dis-
criminant stimulus signaling the availability of
the other. Maybe Muni discovered by chance
the usefulness of looking humans into their
eyes, thereby making it more likely that they
would respond positively to her demands?
Could these behaviours be just instances of so-
cial tool use (in the literal sense) devoid of any
understanding of communicative intentions? A
way of addressing this question is to have a look
at the impact that incorporating eye contact had
on the communicative efficiency of Muni in
problem solving situations.
Comparing physical and social tool
use
When we compare the development of “so-
cial tool use” with the development of physical
tool use in terms of increase of effectiveness in
reaching the final goal, the surprising finding
is that in social tool use there is no such in-
crease. Figure 2 shows the proportion of gorilla
acts that resulted in a positive reaction from the
human (i.e., complying with the request or in-
tended effect; dark part of the columns) in prob-
lem solving contexts. In figure 2 unsuccessful
reactions are further subdivided into “neutral”
(the person does not react helping the gorilla, al-
though she may allow her to act, for example
climbing up him/her) and “negative” (not only
the human fails to help, but also actively inter-
venes to prevent the effect, e.g., fastens more
tightly the cage’s latch after the gorilla requests
to be taken out or makes the negative reaction
explicit, gesturing and saying “No” as a way of
demonstrating unwillingness to comply).
In physical tool use there was a steady in-
crease in the proportion of successful problem
solving reflecting manipulative mastery. In con-
trast, when using people, the many changes that
occur in the acts used by the gorilla (action rit-
ualization and schematization, and coordina-
tion with joint attention behaviours, such as eye
contact and gaze alternation) do not result in an
increase in success —whatever the action, the
human helps only in less than 40% of the time.
This is due to the fact that, during the first
phase, when Muni clumsily dragged and tried to
climb upon people, humans would nonetheless
react helping her (as one typically does with
children) independently of how communica-
tively inept her attempts were. Of course, hu-
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Figure 2. Types of response given by
humans to acts performed by the gorilla to
recruit their help in problem solving.
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(active help), neutral (no response) or
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man help depended upon a number of con-
straining factors, such as the object of the re-
quest. If a forbidden food, or the precious note-
book of the researcher were the targets of the
gorilla, no help was given. Once Muni devel-
oped her joint attentional and intentional ways
of making requests, the same constraints ap-
plied, and only requests that were pertinent and
permissible would be responded to positively. I
know of no study investigating this issue with
human children, but I predict that negatives will
probably be as high as in this gorilla study.
Tool use and people use are fundamentally
different. Physical instruments are radically
different to social instruments. The reaction of
the physical tool depends upon the skill of the
manipulator in exploiting the object proper-
ties. The reaction of the person, however, de-
pends ultimately upon her will and assessment
of the situation. The will of people around
Muni remained curiously unaltered over time.
If we measure their compliance with requests,
this was completely unconnected with the go-
rillas increasing sophistication in communica-
tive behaviour (see Figure 3 for a direct com-
parison).
But of course this is not the whole story.
There is an important change in the way people
react to well-formed communicative requests
with joint attention: a dramatic increase in ac-
tive negatives versus neutral or non-committal
reactions. This increase in “actively negative”
reactions would appear to be highly paradoxi-
cal. Is well-formed communication a less effi-
cient way of social problem solving? How can
we then explain the progressive development of
increasingly complex communicative proce-
dures that replace their tougher, literally more
manipulative earlier counterparts? If efficiency
is measured only in terms of obtaining the de-
sired reward, well-formed communication
makes no difference. But if we consider in
which way the reward fails to be obtained, a
key difference emerges: when not conceding the
reward, humans changed from just ignoring
non-communicative or hardly communicative
attempts, to explicitly denying a communicative
request. Now, denying is a communicative act: it
involves, first of all, acknowledging that a re-
quest has been made, for example by attending
to the gorilla and making eye contact and other
facial, vocal, and verbal reactions; this is then
followed by a “negative”, i.e., further gestures,
vocal, facial, and verbal reactions, that may in-
volve reference to the object (e.g., the door not
to be opened) gaze alternation, and even in cas-
es where the reward must definitely not be ob-
tained by the gorilla, taking preventive mea-
sures, like tightening the door latch.
Communication by the gorilla engenders
communication by the human independently of
how much the gorilla understands of the hu-
man negatives: probably nothing of the verbal
content, but much of the emotional content ex-
pressed in the face, voice and gestures. If the
gorilla just tries to drag the human to a door
she wants open, the human might just resist
and get free of the gorilla’s grip. However, when
the gorilla requests with attention contact, the
human says “No” and acts “No” in face to face
communication with the gorilla.
The eyes in the tool
Eye contact is a key element in identifying
acts as communicative. In eye contact one is
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not simply looking at the other, but at a very
special part of the other —the eyes. When using
instruments there is gaze alternation between
the tool and the reward. For example, Muni
would visually gauge the distance between the
end of a pole and its target destination. From a
social tool use perspective one could argue that
looks at the other follow the same logic: check-
ing if the social tool is acting in the right direc-
tion. However this would only explain gaze al-
ternation between the target and the relevant
parts of the acting human, usually his hands or
his legs. Why did the gorilla (and why do human
infants) include looks at the eyes of the person
(and gaze alternation between eyes and target) if
the eyes themselves perform no action on the
target and looking into the eyes had no effect
upon the ultimate resolution of the problem?
A lean interpretation would be that the eyes
of the other could act as a discriminatory stim-
ulus associated with the probability of the other
acting in response to a request. After all only if
the others are attending to the gestures they can
react to them; also, humans like eye contact and
maybe they are more willing to respond when
looked at in the eyes. This would be similar to
having a red light in a Skinner box that, when
turned on, signals that food will be delivered if
the lever is pressed. Rats quickly learn to press
only if the light is on, and maybe even to press a
different lever to turn the light on (the equiva-
lent of calling the attention of someone). How-
ever one would expect these operants to be
learned only if they do make a difference in the
proportion of rewards obtained. If the light is
not predictive of a higher probability of reward,
and turning the light on makes no difference to
the probability of getting the reward, then why
incorporating all these new, costly patterns of
behaviour?
In the developmental trajectory of Muni
there was a lack of relation between making eye
contact and increasing the probability of get-
ting the reward in a problem solving situation.
Looking at the eyes had no effect whatsoever
on the ultimate success of a request, but it did
upon the way in which she failed to gain the re-
ward. The effect of making eye contact was,
first, an increase in the probability of being told
if the reward was going to be given or not. This
has the benefit of clarifying if the lack of success
is due to the request not having reached its des-
tination and therefore must simply be repeated
(maybe after calling the attention of the other)
or must be abandoned, or made in a different
way. The effect of making eye contact is not me-
chanical or quantifiable in terms of reward ob-
tention. It is an expressive or intersubjective ef-
fectiveness. Looking at someone while gesturing
has the effect of making the other look and ges-
ture back at you, and what matters then is not
only if you obtain or not your goal, but the in-
tersubjective relation with the other.
Conclusions
As with the cases discussed in the introduc-
tion (the impossibility of teaching infants
“counter gaze following” or the insistence of
infants on “being understood” and not just ob-
taining a reward), the emergence of well
formed acts of communication in this infant
gorilla is not related to learning the contingen-
cies of reward delivery. The game of social in-
teraction and communication is played on a
different ground. The introduction of eye con-
tact and mutual attention brings the interac-
tion between gorilla and human into the realm
of what Trevarthen called intersubjectivity (Hub-
ley and Trevarthen, 1979; Gómez, 1998). Lean
interpretations of the associative type cannot
explain the development of early communica-
tion and social interaction. But this does not
mean that we must accept rich interpretations
in terms of sophisticated, adult-like theory of
mind skills.
Eye contact and its associated patterns (mu-
tual facial and vocal expressions) are behaviours
specialized in fulfilling ostensive functions (in
the sense of Sperber and Wilson, 1986), i.e., sig-
nalling that one is acting with a communicative
intention. Although communicative intentions
can be construed and understood in very com-
plex ways as implying mutually embedded,
higher-order intentional relations (“wanting
someone to understand that one wants him to
understand...”), it is also possible to understand
them, in their first ontogenetic and phylogenet-
ic manifestations, as more primitive forms of
second-person intentional relations. Mutual gaze
used in referential communication (pointing to
JUAN CARLOS GÓMEZ / ACCIÓN PSICOLÓGICA, julio 2010, vol. 7, n.o 2, 35-43 41
04_Gomez.qxp 30/9/10 16:40 Página 41
an object or, in the case of the gorilla discussed
here, taking hands to ask someone to act upon
an object) captures the main properties of the
Gricean structure of communication (Gómez,
1994, 1996, 2004). It signals out the existence of
mutual, shared attention: it is a sign of each
participant overtly attending to the attention of
the other. When one tries to put this in words, a
complex, mutually embedded structure results
(“you attend to me attending to you attending to
me... attending to X”). However, this pattern of
mutual attention is achieved without these com-
plex computations. It is a form of second-person
intentionality that precedes metarepresenta-
tional embeddedness (Gómez, 1996, 1998, 2004,
in press). If ostension is interpreted in meta-
representational terms, the problem of mutual
knowledge demands complex cognitive mecha-
nisms capable of computing higher-order inten-
tionality relations. However, if ostension is in-
terpreted in terms of intentionality (in the
original Brentanian sense of relations of about-
ness), then ostension becomes mutual about-
ness that is computed by a specialized mecha-
nism more closely comparable to an emotion
—the emotion of ostension— than to cognition
(Gómez, 2009, 2010).
The failure of simple conditioning or asso-
ciative paradigms to account for elementary
social cognitive skills does not mean that learn-
ing does not play a role in the development of
skills such as gaze following, mutual gaze, or
communicative gesturing. The crux of the mat-
ter is what is learned and how it is learned.
Simple associative contingency models fail to
take into account the perceptual and cognitive
constraints governing learning in infants and
other apes; for example, the perception of an il-
lusory “line of gaze” or the elicitation of those
“ostensive emotions” in eye to eye contact. Ear-
ly social cognition hinges upon the perception,
understanding, and experience of relations of
intentionality in the Brentanian sense of rela-
tion of aboutness connecting agents and ob-
jects (Gómez, 2008, 2009). This, I propose, is
an evolutionarily more primitive and basic
form of mentalism that offers the possibility
of developing “balanced” models of early so-
cial cognition in development and evolution
avoiding the shortcomings of lean and rich
models.
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